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Abstract
Purpose: To review the evidence basis of international aid and health policy.
Context of case: Current international aid policy is largely neoliberal in its promotion of commoditization and privatisation. We
review this policy’s responsibility for the lack of effectiveness in disease control and poor access to care in low and middle-income
countries.
Data sources: National policies, international programmes and pilot experiments are examined in both scientific and grey literature.
Conclusions and discussion: We document how health care privatisation has led to the pool of patients being cut off from public
disease control interventions—causing health care disintegration—which in turn resulted in substandard performance of disease
control.
Privatisation of health care also resulted in poor access. Our analysis consists of three steps. Pilot local contracting-out experiments
are scrutinized; national health care records of Colombia and Chile, two countries having adopted contracting-out as a basis for health
care delivery, are critically examined against Costa Rica; and specific failure mechanisms of the policy in low and middle-income
countries are explored.
We conclude by arguing that the negative impact of neoliberal health policy on disease control and health care in low and middle-
income countries justifies an alternative aid policy to improve both disease control and health care.
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Introduction
The history of international aid can be seen as cycli-
cal. In the 1950s and 1960s, aid policies for Africa
and Asia focused on disease control. Citizens of the
colonies had little political weight and access to health
care was not seen as a priority by the ruling powers.
In 1978, a new strategy—Primary Health Care
(PHC)—was approved at the Alma Ata Conference.
It promoted comprehensive care and community
participation in public services, echoing the 1970’s
social-democrat mood. This concept led to several
confrontations between WHO and multinational
companies (on breast milk substitutes and essential
drugs), with the US even withholding its contribution
to the WHO’s regular budget in 1985 w1x. This caused
a return to the vertical programmes strategies of theInternational Journal of Integrated Care – Vol. 6, 18 September 2006 – ISSN 1568-4156 – http://www.ijic.org/
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1950s for developing countries. Within a year of the
Alma Ata conference, Walsh and Warren had argued
w2x for a reduction in the scope of Primary Health
Care to the control of 4–5 diseases, a strategy labelled
‘‘Selective Primary Health Care’’. The Rockefeller
Foundation and UNICEF stated that the public sector
should be selective in the services offered. This policy
was criticised on the grounds that comprehensive
Primary Health Care including the same disease con-
trol objectives but securing access to health care
incurred the same costs as selective Primary Health
Care w3x. Numerous scientists mobilised against this
initiative w4x, but failed to curb the US policy which
effectively soon had support from the World Bank.
This paper aims to review the evidence basis of this
international aid and health policy. It does not focus
primarily on understanding its causality, even though
the paper addresses health policies in political terms.
Disease control, the favoured model of international
aid has failed in much of its performance in low and
middle-income Countries (LICyMIC) despite intensive
financing. We suggest that international aid policy
shares a responsibility for this. With its promotion of
commoditification and privatisation, much international
aid policy can be seen to reinforce neoliberal health
policies in recipient countries. In assessing its impact
on disease control, we discuss a three-part
hypothesis:
1. The vast majority of disease control interventions
are clinical in essence. To be effective, they gen-
erally need to be integrated into health care deliv-
ery services. Such integration requires health
facilities with patients: a sufficient pool of users
needed by disease control programmes for early
detection.
2. In theory both public and private sectors can pro-
vide integrated disease control activities. Yet inter-
national agencies have been reluctant to allocate
disease control to the private for-profit sector —
for good reasons.
3. Instead international agencies have promoted the
continuing involvement of governments, non-gov-
ernmental organisations (NGOs) and communities
in disease control. At the same time they have
applied the neoliberal principle of health care pri-
vatisation, thereby precluding integration and lead-
ing to unacceptable disease control performance.
We then describe how health care delivery has grad-
ually shifted from the public to private sector and
examine the impact of this on access to health care
in LICyMIC. Our analysis consists of three steps.
Firstly, pilot local contracting-out experiments are ana-
lysed. Following this the national health care records
of Colombia and Chile, two countries which have
adopted contracting out as a basis for health care
delivery, are contrasted with Costa Rica. Lastly, spe-
cific failure mechanisms of the policy in low and
middle-income countries are explored.
The poor performance of disease
control programmes
Disease control, the favoured model of international
aid, in low and middle-income countries (LIC) is a
weak performer. Despite a ten-fold increase in exter-
nal financing for tuberculosis control in LIC over the
last decade w5x, only 27% of bacilloscopic positive
pulmonary tuberculosis cases have access to the
package set out in the DOTS strategy w6,7x. Some
experts consider that DOTS programmes are insuffi-
cient as a tuberculosis control strategy w8x. As for HIV,
3 out of 4.8 million new infections in 2003 occurred in
sub-Saharan Africa w9x. Countries such as South
Africa and Zambia suffer from a HIV prevalence rate
of more than 20%, with Swaziland and Lesotho over
30% and Botswana approaching 40% w10x. AIDS still
kills more than 8000 people every day w11x, of which
more than 6000 are in sub-Saharan Africa. By mid
2004, less than 5% of AIDS patients in this region
were under treatment, compared to over 50% in the
Americas w12x. Malaria is another problem story, with
up to 3 million deaths every year w13x and an increas-
ing population at risk w14x. The United Nations stated
in September 2005 that the Millennium Development
Goals related to tuberculosis, malaria and AIDS con-
trol could not be met in Latin America, Sub Saharan
Africa, South and South East Asia. Furthermore, little
progress was seen on AIDS and tuberculosis in East-
ern Europe and Central Asia.
In the following we outline the responsibility of neo-
liberal health policy for this failure using a three-strand
hypothesis.
Integration: a key to success for
disease control
Disease control activities implemented by specialised
organisational structures, sometimes bringing together
several disease control programmes (such as mater-
nal and child health) are dubbed vertical programmes.
In specific cases vertical programmes can be justified
on technical grounds w15x such as:
● Vector control;
● The control of diseases too rare for generalists to
maintain the necessary specialist skills;
● Outreach to specific risk groups, e.g. commercial
sex workers or drug addicts;International Journal of Integrated Care – Vol. 6, 18 September 2006 – ISSN 1568-4156 – http://www.ijic.org/
3 This article is published in a peer reviewed section of the International Journal of Integrated Care
Figure 1. International aid-promoted health policy.
● The control of epidemics and emergencies;
● The provision of health activities for which there is
no demand, e.g. epidemiological surveillance.
Nevertheless, the number of diseases requiring clinical
interventions makes it impossible to consider vertical
programmes as the gold standard template for disease
control organisation, even where these programmes
are closely co-coordinated amongst themselves w16x.
There are, for example:
● Diseases or health issues already addressed by
programmes (e.g. AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria,
onchocerciasis, immunisations, family planning,
acute respiratory diseases, acute diarrheal dis-
eases, poliomyelitis, leprosy, Chagas, Guinea
worm);
● Virtually all neglected diseases rely partly or com-
pletely on clinical components: Soil transmitted
helminths and schistosomiasis (prasiquantel,
mebendazole, albendazole); lymphatic filariasis
(diagnosis of acute adenolymphangitis attack, lym-
phoedema and scrotal swelling); leprosy (early
diagnosis and multidrug therapy); visceral leish-
maniasis (early diagnosis and treatment at hospi-
tal); onchocerciasis (blindness rehabilitation and
ivermectin, not only in mass distribution); Guinea
worm (early detection and treatment); trypanoso-
miasis (early diagnosis and treatment in speciali-
sed centres); trachoma (antibiotics if prevalence
under 20%); Cholera (rehydration, vaccination,
antibiotics), Rabies (curative vaccination) and
Buruli Ulcer (tuberculostatics);
● Chronic degenerative pathologies (e.g. cardio- and
cerebrovascular diseases and diabetes).
The need to integrate programmes into local health
facilities in order to achieve a reasonable prospect for
successful disease control is stressed by many
authors w17–22x. They also point to the merit of
integrating curative and preventive care. Examples
include the potential for detecting a patient with tuber-
culosis amongst those with cough, or suggesting vac-
cination to a patient or to a population with whom the
practitioner has established trust w23x.
Public rather than private disease
control: understandable caution
In theory, both the public and the private sector can
carry out disease control activities, but historically the
public sector has taken this responsibility. Despite the
widespread promotion of public-private partnerships
w24–27x, international aid agencies have been cau-
tious about contracting out disease control to the
private sector. Instead, such agencies have promoted
continued involvement of government facilities in dis-
ease control under the general label of ‘prioritisation’
of their interventions. Their caution is understandable.
The results of contracting out disease control to the
private for-profit sector are not promising w28,29x,
except for tuberculosis control under specific condi-
tions w30x. Furthermore, private providers may not
oppose the provision of disease control by the public
sector, as they often work part-time in public services
providing the opportunity to refer the selected patients
to their own private consultation w31x.
Public disease control & private health
care: a catch-22
While disease control remains public, aid agencies
have been encouraging a market approach to health
care delivery in LIC for over a decade w32–35x. The
transfer of ‘public’ care to the private for-profit sector
is a core message of their policy on the grounds of
the supposed higher efficiency of the for-profit sector
and the poor responsiveness of the public one. Once
predominantly providers, governments now have new
roles as ‘stewards’, steering care by regulation and
supervision. In theory, such privatised care could be
funded publicly.
Figure 1 indicates these roles of the public and private
sectors as promoted by neoliberal health policy.
This doctrine was introduced in LIC and MIC where
the market was seen as attractive, such as in parts of
Asia and Latin America w36,37x. It was seen as less
relevant in contexts where the market could not be
developed easily, as in many parts of Africa. It was
also not promoted in countries where geo-strategic
considerations dictated an aid policy with clear social
goals, as is the case in Jordan, the Southern Philip-
pines and those central Asian republics close to
Afghanistan.
One outcome of this policy was a disease control
focus to Ministries of Health (MoHs), with less support
for health care delivery. The continued concentration
on vertical disease control efforts by the international
aid community is reflected in the efforts to set up and
channel significant aid through the Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria and which hasInternational Journal of Integrated Care – Vol. 6, 18 September 2006 – ISSN 1568-4156 – http://www.ijic.org/
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been criticised strongly for ignoring the needs of, or
even weakening, the wider health system.
This aid and health policy precluded effective integra-
tion in the field and led to a true catch-22; the pool of
patients was cut off from disease control interventions
and ended up achieving substandard detection and
follow-up rates. This point has been mathematically
demonstrated in a recent paper. In order to assess
the potential for integrating malaria control interven-
tions in underused health services, a Piot predictive
model was used to estimate malaria cure rates. Par-
ameters from the best performing African malaria
programmes influencing treatment at home and in
health facilities were applied to a rural district in Mali,
where access to care was very limited. It was dem-
onstrated that, with a low utilisation rate, adequate
control combining home treatment and professional
treatment was impossible, even applying the best
parameters from other countries. On the contrary, cure
rates with a higher utilisation rate were 62% better.
Thus, if malaria patients are to be treated and followed
up early, basic health services need to deliver inte-
grated care and be attended by an adequate pool of
users w38x.
Another example of failing disease control is Colom-
bia, where TB case finding decreased after neoliberal
reform w39,40x.
Furthermore, disease control programmes strained
first line public health care delivery. This occurred
through pressure exerted by disease control manag-
ers w41x, by multiplication of disease-specific divisions
in (inter)national administrations, by ill-defined priority-
setting and increasing opportunity cost w41x, unrealistic
costing, inadequate budgets, and financial overruns
w21x, failure to make clear the lines of command w42x;
tension between health care professionals over
income disparity, treatment discrepancies and oppor-
tunity costs w43x and problems with sustainability
w21,41–46x.
Management by objective, the philosophical corner-
stone of such programmes, transformed health organ-
isations into what Mintzberg classifies as mechanistic
bureaucracies w47x.
Poor access to health care
delivery
Access to health care in LIC and MIC is also disap-
pointing. Despite, or in some cases, because of, more
than a decade of reforms, almost 50% of health
systems do not provide adequate access to care for
their citizens w48x. Access to care is particularly difficult
in China and in the republics of the former Soviet
Union. It has also deteriorated in Latin America. A
third of the world’s population has no reliable access
to essential drugs; this rate rises to above 50% in the
poorest countries of Africa and Asia w49x.
We raise the question, as we did for the poor perform-
ance of disease control programmes, as to whether
international aid policy, shares responsibility for this
poor access to health care.
In most LIC, the use and quality of government health
facilities has fallen to an all-time low. Burkina Faso
saw its utilisation of health care services (expressed
by the number of sickness episodes per inhabitant
per year) dropping from 0.32 in 1986 to 0.17 in 1997
w50x. Uganda’s University Hospital of Mbarara is pic-
tured by Kavalier as ‘‘decades away from the end of
the 20th century’’ w51x. Even in MIC, the problem
exists. Ellen Roskam asks: ‘‘Where can you be treated
by a doctor who, last year, worked a 1000 hours more
than his official timetable, who has earned less than
15$ymonth, who has not been paid for 5 months, who
has worked without drugs or bandages in an operating
theatre with a leaking roof and where there has been
no investment for many years? Maybe somewhere in
Africa? No, in Eastern Europe’’ w52x. Managers of
public health services faced major challenges in the
light of the contradictions imposed by reforms w53x.
Meanwhile, care in the private health facilities
remained expensive, inefficient and unregulated. Care
suffered from accessibility and quality problems.
Cream skimming, semi-monopolistic settings and cor-
ruption were widespread. The increase in unneces-
sary prescriptions, admissions, length of stay, lab tests
and medical imaging exemplifies how profitability dom-
inated evidence-based practice. In Brazil, the caesa-
rean section rate reached 31% in the public sector,
and 72% in the private sector w54x.
Admittedly, poor access to decent health care in
LIC is associated with multiple and interlinked
determinants:
● An economic crisis, resulting in decreasing pur-
chasing power, downsizing of public services and
falling salaries, in most highly indebted poor coun-
tries w55x. In Latin America, deteriorating access to
publicly delivered health care was associated with
the public services’ narrowing problem-solving
capacity. Furthermore, professional associations
sought part-time employment in public services
enabling private doctors to spot profitable patients
and send them to their own clinics.
● Static or increasing social inequalities, as observed
in the majority of countries in Latin America and
the Caribbean, the region with the highest inequal-
ity in the world w56x;International Journal of Integrated Care – Vol. 6, 18 September 2006 – ISSN 1568-4156 – http://www.ijic.org/
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● A combination of external and internal adverse
conditions—the simultaneous effect of Structural
Adjustment Programmes (SAP) and insufficient
social control on administration, lack of democracy,
patronage and nepotism, resulting in low priority
given to the social sector w55,57x.
However, the health policy promoted by international
aid agencies may also have played a specific role
through the promotion of the private sector. We distin-
guish five different, sometimes complementary, ways
in which the transfer of health care delivery to the
private sector has been fulfilled:
1. Governments underfinanced public services,
allowing the private sector to offer care without
having to deal with subsidised competition. Typi-
cally, this was the scenario adopted by Sub Sahar-
an Africa and Andean countries.
2. Governments, accepting the efficiency arguments
of the international agencies, gradually reduced
the operational role of the public sector to a greater
focus on disease control programmes. Internation-
al agencies financed such programmes.
3. Governments subcontracted health care to the
private sector (in a very limited number of coun-
tries, such as Lebanon, Colombia, Zambia).I n
Latin America, International Financing Institutions
also promoted and financed the privatisation of
health care.
4. Governments leased or sold public hospitals to
the private sector. The best-known experiences,
promoted by World Bank authors as options of
public–private partnerships, are Stockholm’s St.
Goran’s and a few converted Australian hospitals
w58x. In low and middle-income countries, this
pathway was the exception rather than the rule.
Examples included the former Soviet Union and
Albania w59x.
5. Governments granted managerial autonomy to
public hospitals, blurring the boundaries between
public and for-profit objectives.
Policy actors have cited all but the first of these five
pathways as beneficial. In practice, however, it was
the under funding of the public sector that most
frequently led to privatisation. This under funding
happened in many countries in the 1990s, as evi-
denced by the gap shown by the WHO Macroeconom-
ic and Health Commission Report w60x. The World
Bank’s (WB) SAPs and the International Monetary
Fund’s (IMF) Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facili-
ties (ESAFs) effectively reinforced the liberalisation of
services by starving them of public resources.
One consequence of this under funding is now becom-
ing apparent, with the haemorrhaging of professional
staff to the private sector and increasingly to industri-
alised health systems, understandably attracted by
the higher salary pull-factors.
The Bretton Woods institutes never effectively
enforced the loan conditions to increase public social
spending, a responsibility also neglected by LIC and
MIC governments. International aid never compensat-
ed for the reduction in government health expenditure.
Rather it reinforced the second scenario, driving the
fading public sector to focus on externally financed
disease control activities, straining the public delivery
of care and thereby creating a market opportunity for
the private sector.
We turn now to discussion of contracting experiences
drawing on pilot experiments and national data.
Evidence from pilot experiments: con-
tracting out and managerial autonomy
The public private partnership (PPP) approaches were
developed in the context of New Public Management.
PPP encompasses both Private Financing Initiatives
(PFI) and contracting out. The former refers to private
money being used to finance health care infrastructure
that previously had been under government respon-
sibility. So far, this technique has been mainly applied
in the United Kingdom and less so in developing
countries. The other approach, contracting out, has
met difficulties over the last decade. In Southern
Africa, researchers compared the operational cost per
admission and per in-patient day between public rural
district hospitals and subcontracted private for-profit
hospitals w61–63x. The few studies do not support the
hypothesis that efficiency increases when care is
subcontracted to private companies w62–64x. These
studies suggest that a similar quality of care can be
achieved at a lower cost in the private sector, but at
a total higher cost to the public authorities once private
profit margins are included. The private providers’
profit margins override the financial gains arising from
improved cost-efficiency. The only positive outcomes
were associated with buying care from NGOs, where
there was no profit motive.
In addition, few studies have ever examined whether
the pricing policy applied by the private sector is
equitable w65,66x and, to our knowledge, there has
been no study to determine whether the private health
sector in LIC improves patients’ independence from
professional care. However, the quest for gains that
underpins the private sector is unlikely to favour
solidarity or increase the patients’ medical autonomy.
The strategy of developing hospital autonomy was
expected to facilitate reinvestment and to improveInternational Journal of Integrated Care – Vol. 6, 18 September 2006 – ISSN 1568-4156 – http://www.ijic.org/
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staff motivation without drawing on the national
budget. Managerial autonomy became a widespread
policy in a number of low and middle-income coun-
tries. However, in practice government hospitals were
often granted managerial autonomy without defining
their objectives or providing supervision. Health staff
often managed ‘‘autonomous’’ public hospitals as pri-
vate facilities w67x, enabling public hospitals to adapt
a for-profit rationale while retaining public funds. This
happened, for example, with Chinese state hospitals
depending on profit-making private services to break
even w68x. This pathway led to increased costs for
users and to a reorientation of the bulk of hospital
activities from secondary care to simple, first-line
clinical services. Underpaid staff quickly understood
that hospitalising a rich person with bronchitis, for
example, instead of a poor patient in need of a surgical
intervention, generated income. Opportunistic cream
skimming changed the case-mix. Neither the state nor
communities were able to exert control. This mana-
gerial stance created obstacles for poor patients need-
ing secondary care and favoured instead
hospitalisation of (middle class) primary cases. Similar
processes can explain why private hospitals in Thai-
land had a shorter length of stay, a larger percentage
of admissions of children and yet no increase in
utilisation of their operation theatre w69x.
Lastly, staff motivation rarely went beyond an under-
standable eagerness to access hospital profits to
supplement salaries, which in turn hampered rein-
vestment w70x.
Evidence from national data:
contracting out equals inefficiency,
ineffectiveness and inequity
Many international blueprints advocated subcontract-
ing care to the private sector in LIC, but few countries
actually did it. This is because most LIC and MIC
were unable to generate the required funds. Govern-
ment finances were mainly earmarked for wages leav-
ing little latitude for contracting out. While in Western
Europe government spending in 2001 represented
more than 70% of total health expenditure, it was less
than 40% in China, 30% in Vietnam and 20% in
India w71x.
A few countries did, however, manage to subcontract
to the private health sector, and we now scrutinise
health care privatisation in two of them—Colombia
and Chile—contrasting them with Costa Rica which
maintained publicly oriented social insurance and
health services. In 1993, Colombia adopted a pur-
chaseryprovider split and contracting-out policy and
committed resources to it. The State largely freed
itself from direct provision of services. The exceptions
were disease control activities and health care delivery
for the non-insured and for pathologies not covered
by health insurance—mainly in public hospitals.
Chile partly privatised its health insurance, whilst
keeping a large public health sector, through its public
social insurance and its public health services. Private
health insurance and care have never been more than
a separate, marginal health system for the well-off.
ISAPRES private health insurers never covered more
than 25% of the population, and are now at less than
16%. The strong backbone of a public health system
has not been broken by the dictatorship of Pinochet
even though public health services financing was
drastically reduced. Since 1989, democratic govern-
ments have steeply increased public health
expenditure.
In Costa Rica at the end of the last century, the
average private health expenditure was only 25% of
total health expenditure in contrast with 58% across
Latin America w72x. The Social Security Administration
of Costa Rica (SSAC) is the single (and public) health
insurer in Costa Rica (private health insurance exists
but is marginal). It both purchases and provides care.
We argue firstly that, unlike Colombia, health systems’
outputs in both Chile and Costa Rica are excellent.
Secondly, Costa Rica was more efficient than Chile in
securing health status for its population.
The achievement claimed to illustrate the Colombian
reform success was an advance in social insurance
coverage which almost doubled from 31 to 62 percent
of the population between 1992 and 2004 w73x leading
to affiliation for 18.5 million (from a target population
of 22 million), with a remarkable acceleration of affili-
ation in 2004 and 2005, after stagnation for several
years w74x. However, caution is warranted. The benefit
package for the poor is still only half that for the
contributing affiliates. Furthermore, whereas before
the reform, 61.7% of people needing health care were
seen by a doctor, this proportion had fallen to 51.1%
in 2000 w17,24x. Each year 6.26% of the population
suffered catastrophic health expenditure, and the
poorest quintile had out-of-pocket payments four times
higher than the richest w75x. Even more worrying,
according to a periodical national survey, the propor-
tion of people consulting in the month before the
survey increased from 1993 to 1997 (from 7.5% to
23.8%), but then decreased dramatically in 2003 to
9.5%, meaning that theoretical high coverage by
health insurance did not translate into higher utilisation
rates of health services, in spite of increased health
expenditure (from 7 to 10% of GDP) w76x.International Journal of Integrated Care – Vol. 6, 18 September 2006 – ISSN 1568-4156 – http://www.ijic.org/
7 This article is published in a peer reviewed section of the International Journal of Integrated Care
Table 1. Infant and maternal mortality rates, Costa Rica, Chile and Colombia1
Reduction
IMR IMR IMR MMR
1970 2001 1970–2001 2001
Costa Rica 62 9 :7 29
Chile 78 10 : 8 23
Colombia 69 19 : 4 80
In contrast in Costa Rica, utilisation of medical health
services is high with acceptable, affordable and per-
ceived good quality health care, compared to other
developing countries. Only 0.12% of the Costa Rican
households suffered from catastrophic health expen-
diture, 52 times less than in Colombia.
Given the inequity within both Chilean society and the
health system’s financing, one would expect accessi-
bility to care by the poor to be limited. However,
among those who declared having felt sick in the last
month, 73.9% from the poorest quintile sought care
compared to 79.7% from the richest w77x. Data on
utilisation rate also confirms this relatively equitable
access with increases from 2.65 and 3.27 in 1990 to
3.85 and 4.12 in 1999, in FONASA and ISAPRES,
respectively w78x. However, the utilisation rates still
differ between poor and rich municipalities: by a factor
of 2.8 for Primary Health Care, 3.9 for emergencies
and 2 for inpatient care w79x.
Infant mortality rate is known to reflect general social
and economic conditions, and not solely access to
medical care w27x. However, child mortality due to
acute respiratory infections and acute diarrhoeal dis-
eases, can be viewed as avoidable mortality and used
as tracer pathologies for quality of care w28x, including
in less developed countries w29x. These rates have
clearly increased in Colombia since 1997 w16x. Peri-
natal mortality is also known to be an indicator for
access to quality health care. It doubled from 1996 to
1997 and continues to rise w16x. The same goes for
maternal mortality, stable since 2000 at an unaccept-
able high level of about 100 deaths per 100,000
newborn w80x. By combining middle income with high
human development since 1995, Costa Rica achieved
a life expectancy at birth of 78 years (second only to
Canada in the Americas), an infant mortality rate of
9y1000, equivalent to a sevenfold reduction over the
last three decades (equivalent data in Colombia is 19
with a fourfold reduction) and a tuberculosis preva-
lence of 19y100,000 (69 in Colombia). Several of
these features are related to the social commitment
of successive Costa Rican governments w81x in partic-
ular public expenditure on health and education was
4.9 and 4.7% of GDP in 2001 compared to 3.6 and
4.4% in Colombia w81x. However, the pivotal role of
health services and policy played by Costa Rican
human development should also be recognised.
Numerous indicators suggest an impact directly attrib-
utable to health services:
– Comparison of IMR and MMR, with Chile and Col-
ombia both at similar income levels, reveals the
significant advance of Costa Rica (see Table 1);
– Perinatal mortality rate dropped from 12.0y1000 in
1972 to 5.4y1000 in 2001 w84x, which suggests
obstetric improvements;
– Pneumonia specific mortality in under ones
dropped from 5.4y1000 in 1972 to 0.3y1000 in
2001 w82x, which suggests improved and faster
access to health services;
– Tuberculosis specific mortality dropped from 7.2y
100,000 in 1972 to 4.4y100,000 in 2001 w82x,
despite increased incidence, which suggests a
functioning programme.
Finally, in Chile, health indicators are good, with high
life expectancy and very low infant mortality and
maternal mortality.
These contrasted achievements were not explained
by the level of investments in health, but rather the
contrary. Health expenditure rocketed since the intro-
duction of managed competition in Colombia, with an
increase from 7 to almost 10% of GDP w76x. In Costa
Rica, the excellent outputs were achieved at a mod-
erate cost; one comparison summarises the Costa
Rican health policy achievements: the country spends
9 times less on health than the USA and scores better
on life expectancy.
In Chile, private ISAPRES spend 3 times more on
administration per affiliated than public FONASA
(about 20% vs. 6%). In 2000, the GDP share allocated
to health was 7.3%, of which 3.1% was public and
Infant mortality rate as the probability of dying between birth and exactly 1
one year of age, expressed per 1,000 live births (1970 and 2001 figures,
from UNICEF); infant mortality rate reduction 1970–2001 calculated from the
1970 and 2001 figures; maternal mortality ratio as the annual number of
deaths of women from pregnancy-related causes per 100,000 live births (data
refer to the most recent year available during the period specified, from
UNICEF’s The State of the Worlds Children 2003, based on national data,
adjusted for underreporting and misclassification in a joint effort by UNICEF
and WHO); health expenditure per capita in PPP US$ (from WHO); GDP per
capita in PPP US$ (from WB’s World Development Indicators); GDP per
capita annual growth rate (aggregates from WB for the Human Development
Report Office).
Sources: United Nations Development Programme (2003) Human Develop-
ment Indicators. In Human Development Report 2003. Millennium Develop-
ment Goals: A compact among nations to end human poverty. UNDP, New
York, NY, USA, pp 237–339, http:yyhdr.undp.orgyreportsyglobaly2003;United
Nations Development Programme (2004) Human Development Indicators. In
Human Development Report 2004: Cultural liberty in today’s diverse world.
UNDP, New York, NY, USA, pp 139–250, http:yyhdr.undp.orgyreportsyglobaly
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4.2% private. Out-of-pocket expenditures were 27%
of total health expenditure.
The Colombian health policy in the last 2 years
achieved a good result in health insurance coverage
of the poor, but with a very limited benefit package, a
reduction in real access and at a very high cost
(almost 10% of GNP), due in part to the coexistence
of supply and demand subsidies and to a generalised
evasion of contributions to social health insurance.
In Chile, the overall good demographic and epidemi-
ologic records may in part be due to the sustained
high economic growth rate, and the spectacular reduc-
tion in poverty: from 39% in 1990 to 21% in 2000,
without precedent in Chile and also exceptional inter-
nationally w83,84x. The excellent health indicators are
due to this public system, good education levels and
economic growth, and hardly to ISAPRES and private
providers who attended the healthy, young, and well-
off urban. Instead, the private care insurance and
delivery can be incriminated for the high cost of the
Chilean health system, for its deficient solidarity and
lack of equity.
In conclusion, the evidence of the three countries
appears to contradict international recommendations
to privatise health care in developing countries. The
remarkable sustained achievements of Costa Rica
suggest the following:
– A unified public health services system, in which
government expenditure represents the bulk of
total expenditure, permits integration;
– Dominant, though non-monopolistic publicly ori-
ented services offer accessible health care;
– Contracting-in secures both management and pro-
duction targets (as opposed to the much promoted
contracting-out).
– A single, public insurer (private insurance being
virtually non-existent), which contributes to soli-
darity and general access to care
– Users and communities can participate in publicly
oriented health services management, in contra-
diction to what the private for profit sector permits.
Unmet conditions for contracting-out:
the mechanics of a failure
The common cause of failure (both pilot and national)
of contracting-out in low and middle-income countries
lies in a mix of technical and political features, as we
now discuss.
If we assume that contracting-out guarantees access
to good quality health care in Western Europe, why is
it failing in LIC and MIC? We would argue that the
technical requirements for contracting-out clash with
political and administrative reality. Efficient subcon-
tracting thrives on effective control and regulation,
which is an unfulfilled condition in most LIC and MIC.
In Europe, the government regulates and controls the
private sector, draws up contracts for the provision of
health care, checks whether these contracts are imple-
mented and oversees reimbursement. This situation
is different from that found in LIC and MIC, where
state mechanisms to control patronage, corruption and
biased decisions at the administrative level are weak.
Furthermore, government doctors, who are generally
underpaid, expect to have a parallel private practice;
as such they are unlikely to cut off the branch they
are sitting on by agreeing contracts favourable to the
state. Large amounts of money, as generated by
contracting out, constitute a big temptation in the
absence of adequate control.
Administrative and regulatory structures were rarely in
place in the social sector when most LIC and MIC
embarked upon neoliberal policies. This was a lethal
situation, as ‘‘Failure to develop such capacity and
political conditions before or simultaneously with enter-
ing into contracting and demand-side financing
reforms can have negative consequences to judge
from experiences in India, Mexico, Papua New Guin-
ea, South Africa and Zimbabwe’’ w85x. ‘‘Contracting
out clinical services is particularly complex, even when
limited to non-profit providers such as church hospitals
in Ghana or the United Republic of Tanzania and
Zimbabwe’’ w85x. Only strong democratic governments
with adequate regulatory resources can guarantee
access and quality of care, avoid fragmentation of the
system, enforce a solidarity-based financing system
and keep NGOs and the private-for-profit sector under
control.
Figueras and Saltman note that the reform of the
medical and health sector in Europe called on public
health skills to estimate the needs, evaluate the inter-
ventions and the impact of the measures w86x.A s
these skills are in short supply in LIC and MIC, Brugha
and Zwi notice ‘‘major problems in service quality,
especially in the private sector’’ and see the search
for profit as responsible for the gap between health
professionals’ medical knowledge and its practice
w87x. Competent professionals from LIC and MIC are
numerous, but they are not in the right spot.
Discussion
Recently, a signal of policy change has been sent by
the late WHO Director General Dr. Jong-wook, and
by UNICEF w88x. In an effort to diversify international
aid to the health sector of developing countries, theseInternational Journal of Integrated Care – Vol. 6, 18 September 2006 – ISSN 1568-4156 – http://www.ijic.org/
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two organisations recommend reconstruction of health
systems to increase access to general, appropriate
health care in the services while at the same time
developing disease control. The critical question is:
how?
The commoditification and privatisation of services,
with the public sector confined to deliver disease
control activities alongside a private sector increasing-
ly taking over health care, constrains both disease
control programme performance and people’s access
to services. So why is neoliberal policy still actively
promoted? Neoliberal health policies have aggravated
the commodification and privatisation of health care,
but to attribute such sweeping changes to the ‘‘impo-
sition’’ of a doctrine by aid agencies would be to
negate the complexity of this profoundly political pro-
cess and the involvement of a set of actors that
include ‘‘aid agencies’’, the Bretton Woods Institutions,
Western governments, the World Health Organization
and developing country governments, which have
either actively promoted or uncritically accepted such
policies. Furthermore, the following vested interests
may also contribute to this position:
● The private medical sector in LIC and MIC which
lobbies for access to public funds;
● Local middle and upper classes which resist
increased taxation to allow funding healthcare for
the poor, since they can opt out for private health
care;
● International health care companies based in
industrial countries looking for opportunities to
access the Asian and Latin American markets,
through the General Agreement on Trade in Serv-
ices (GATS) negotiation rounds;
● Pharmaceutical companies showing little interest in
a public health care market that dispenses mostly
generic and essential drugs and may not be very
creditworthy. In contrast, disease control pro-
grammes financed by industrialised countries rep-
resent a market for the development of new
products;
● European politicians supporting the control of infec-
tious epidemics in LIC and MIC that threaten the
industrialised world (e.g. tuberculosis, AIDS,
SARS, avian flu).
● Disease control programmes enjoying high poten-
tial political visibility and hence support through
mechanisms such as public–private partnerships;
● Civil servants in charge of disease control pro-
grammes, enjoying privileged access to decision-
makers in industrialised countries, see an emergent
programme as a significant career opportunity.
These forces have systematically used recommenda-
tions of international aid agencies to promote national
health policies in line with their interests. This explains
the adoption of neoliberal health policies.
The GATS negotiations within the Word Trade Organ-
ization (WTO) w89x might further consolidate these
results. GATS threatens to make illegal any public
health care service that has not been privatised, based
on the claim that the government should not offer
subsidised services that the market also offers w90x.
An opt-out alternative exists in theory, but LICs are
unlikely to be in a strong bargaining position to use it
through successive rounds of negotiation.
Conclusions
Neoliberal health policy promoted by international aid
agencies in low and middle-income countries—state
disease control programmes provided in services con-
fined to deliver them and contracting out of curative
care—failed to control diseases successfully, nor did
it improve access to care. Its results were disappoint-
ingly out of step with those expected, its technicality
out of step with the socio-political conditions and its
motives with humanitarian objectives.
An alternative aid policy for LIC and MIC health
sectors is badly needed if we genuinely aim to improve
access to health care, controlling diseases and com-
bating poverty.
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